Information programs that leverage peer comparisons are used to encourage pro-social behavior in many contexts. We document how imperfect information generates heterogenous responses to treatments involving personalized feedback and peer comparisons. In our field experiment in retail electricity, we find that most households either overestimate or underestimate their relative energy consumption pre-treatment. Households that overestimated respond to new information by temporarily increasing electricity consumption, whereas households that underestimated take steps that lead to long term energy conservation. We explore the implications of these results for the external validity and design of information programs.
Introduction
Information programs have long been used to encourage social and behavioral change. A range of development interventions affect behavior by providing information on the benefits of drinking water treatment (Kremer et. al 2010) , hand washing (Luby et. al 2005) , or on the costs of risky behavior, as with HIV risk prevalence (Dupas 2011) . In the developed world, information programs have been shown, for example, to encourage retirement savings plan participation (Duflo and Saez 2003) and reduce individuals' levels of caloric intake (Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen 2011) .
Interventions that further inform individuals about how their behavior compares with that of their peers have been shown to enhance voter turnout (Gerber and Rogers, 2009 ), rates of charitable giving (Frey and Meier 2004) , retirement savings (Beshears et al. 2013 ) and water and energy conservation Price 2013, Allcott 2011b ). These non-pecuniary, nudgebased approaches to encouraging pro-social behavior are potentially a low-cost alternative to politically-sensitive regulation. As a result, they have garnered much attention from policymakers in these and other contexts.
A key issue confronting policymakers seeking to scale up these programs is the external validity of existing estimates of a program's impact. Do estimates from pilots or locally-run information treatments apply to larger and more diverse populations? Can population characteristics explain why similar programs yield different results? If so, what characteristics matter most? The extent to which information is new or surprising to individuals is likely to be of first order importance. At the extreme, providing information to perfectly informed individuals should have little effect, other than via increased salience. Becker (1965) and Levitt and List (2007) provide frameworks that explain how information frictions can cause peer comparisons to produce heterogeneous treatment effects. In particular, individuals who heavily engage in pro-social behavior could decrease their levels of engagement when they learn that their peers are not matching their efforts. Such "boomerang effects" (Schultz et. al 2007) imply that individuals that overestimate their relative levels of prosocial behavior will potentially decrease their engagement if treated with an information pro-1 gram with peer comparisons. 1 In contrast, these models also predict that households that are minimally engaged in pro-social behavior will increase their participation when they learn that they fall short of the social norm.
Although the literature on information treatments is extensive, little is known about how unobserved, pre-treatment informedness actually shapes information program outcomes. There is virtually no evidence on how informedness affects the external validity of program effects, nor how it should be accounted for in program design. The latter issue is particularly relevant for policymakers looking to enhance pro-social behavior and avoid boomerang effects.
This paper sheds light on these issues using a field experiment that involves a novel two-step experimental design. We first run a baseline survey that elicits individuals' beliefs over their relative levels of pro-social behavior. We then randomly inform individuals about how their behavior actually compares with that of their peers, and track their levels of pro-social behavior over time. To our knowledge, we provide the first test of whether imperfect information over peers' behavior in fact generates heterogeneous effects in information programs. We further study a key implication from our test results, namely how the distribution of pre-treatment informedness affects the external validity of program effects.
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The context for our study is the retail electricity market and the pro-social behavior of interest is energy conservation. We are interested in information programs in this setting for two reasons. First, behavioral interventions that inform households about energy conservation strategies and provide peer comparisons over energy usage have been used extensively in 1 Boomerang effects have been of concern in a number of interventions, including those that aim to promote energy conservation (Schultz et. al 2007 and Allcott 2011b) , water conservation (Ferraro and Price 2013) , and public goods contributions (Croson and Shang 2008, Chen et. al 2010) .
2 As such, the usefulness of our baseline survey for conducting such a test and studying related implications for external validity speaks to prescriptions from Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer (2008) in development, who advocate using baseline surveys for identifying sources of treatment heterogeneity and evaluating external validity in social programs. electricity markets. As Delmas et al. (2013) document, more than 150 informational field trials spanning more than 500,000 households have been run since 1975.
Second, the retail electricity market is particularly well-suited to studying informedness and its impact on the external validity and design of information programs. Treatment effect estimates from information programs in electricity markets are highly heterogeneous (Delmas et al. 2013) . This heterogeneity provides a priori motivation to study external validity and the channels that generate heterogeneous treatment effects in our context. In addition, boomerang effects have been documented in electricity market information programs and are a central concern in their design (Schultz et. al 2007 and Allcott 2011b) 3 . Further, previous studies have found households exhibit a high degree of ignorance regarding energy consumption. 4 Finally, large volumes of pre-and post-treatment behavioral data can be collected at low cost.
Our paper delivers three main results. We first show that most households are generally uninformed about relative energy use: only one quarter of our sample correctly identify their relative consumption levels. Contrary to our expectations, households do not systematically underestimate their energy use. Rather, we find many think they are "average" users, and that incorrect high and low energy use households symmetrically overestimate and underestimate their positions in the energy use distribution.
We then test whether pre-treatment informedness generates heterogeneous treatment effects from our information program. The program is similar to previous information treat- 3 Organizations like OPower also recognize the importance that boomerang effects play in information interventions in promoting energy conservation. The company attempts to mitigate their effect by simultaneously providing "injunctive norms", that is, reminders to all users that energy conservation is pro-social, and rewarding low users with smiley faces or other forms of praise. They also provide multiple reference points, for example, individual-level rankings within neighbors, so that almost everyone receives a message that, to some extent, says "you can still do better". ments (for instance, Allcott 2011b) in that it provides households with energy saving tips and peer comparisons over relative energy use. Our pooled estimates are directly in-line with predictions from Becker (1965) and Levitt and List (2007) : in our preferred specification, households that overestimate their relative consumption levels increase their use by four percent, indicating the presence of boomerang effects. 5 In contrast, households that underestimate their use decrease by two percent. We observe no change in energy use in response to treatment for households who were correct. The heterogeneous treatment effect results survive a number of robustness checks, including allowing "average user" responses to count as "I don't know", controls for potential mean reversion, and sample attrition bias corrections.
Expanding on these results, we study the evolution of these heterogeneous treatment effects over time. We uncover a new asymmetry in the persistence of these effects. Boomerang effects appear to be short-lived, perhaps salience-driven, phenomena: households that overestimate their relative energy use immediately increase their use in response to treatment, however exhibit negligible treatment effects from five months following treatment onward. In contrast,
households that ex-ante underestimate their energy use see a steady decline in energy consumption through the entire treatment window. After learning they are in fact high energy users, these households appear to make permanent changes in behavior, possibly because of social learning through the information treatment's peer comparisons (e.g., Becker 1965), and/or in response to previously unfelt "moral costs" from the environmental impact of their high energy use (e.g., Levitt and List 2007) .
Beyond their academic interest, these long-run findings also have policy relevance. They 5 While our private partner was willing to elicit households' beliefs over relative energy use, they were primarily interested in program evaluation and only allow for one type of information treatment. As a result, we were restricted in our ability to discriminate between the Becker (1965) social learning and Levitt and List moral cost mechanisms through our experiment. See Ferraro and Price (2013) for a design that discriminates among these channels. They cannot, however, test for the effect of imperfect information over peer behavior in behavioral programs, which is fundamental to both of these mechanisms.
highlight the importance of looking beyond a 3 month window when evaluating energy conservation programs: rebound effects disappear and conservation effects gain in importance.
To complete the analysis, we quantify the extent to which sub-population informedness affects the external validity of information program treatment effects. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, we show pre-treatment informedness plays an important role quantitatively in determining treatment effects from information programs. Our results naturally raise questions about what type of households are likely to underestimate relative energy use. We show that higher income households that are more environmentally conscious are more likely to underestimate their relative energy use, and hence be more responsive to treatment.
Related literature
Our main contribution is to the cited body of research on information treatments that encourage pro-social behavior. Of all the treatments that we have reviewed, we have only found three that collect baseline information on informedness. Fitzsimons et al. (2012) and Davis et al. (2011) in the nutrition and sanitation literatures record knowledge both before and after information interventions. Both find their intervention caused a change in knowledge, however neither explore heterogeneous program effects as a function of baseline knowledge.
The closest example to our experimental design that we could find comes from a health intervention by Jalan and Somanathan (2008) . The authors undertake a baseline survey to assess awareness of potential causes of diarrhoea. They find some evidence that pre-treatment behavior is correlated with awareness. They do not find that these households are more likely to respond to treatment. Our paper differs considerably from this study given our focus on: (1) behavioral programs that leverage peer comparisons; (2) testing whether information frictions generate heterogeneous treatment effects in such programs; and (3) quantifying the impact imperfect information has on the external validity of treatment effects.
We also build on prior studies of information interventions in electricity markets. 6 Our study and its focus on the determinants of heterogeneous treatment effects most closely re-6 See Delmas et al. (2013) for an excellent review of this extensive literature. 5 late to Allcott (2011b) and Costa and Kahn (2013) . These authors respectively provide evidence of how differences in energy consumption (e.g., high vs. low users) and political ideology (e.g., Liberals vs. Conservatives) predict heterogeneous effects from information interventions. Neither are able to separately identify the role of imperfect information from other factors (e.g., environmental consciousness). Our paper thus makes a contribution by providing a direct test of how imperfect information leads to heterogeneous treatment effects in electricity market information programs.
Our study also relates to research on limited consumer awareness over energy consumption. This includes studies that find households are unaware of the relative energy use of different household appliances (Attari et. al 2010) and fuel economy across similar vehicles (Allcott 2011a and 2012) . Related work by Jessoe and Rapson (2013) and Ito (2013) respectively imply that households are imperfectly informed about real-time energy use (which reduces price sensitivity), and that they respond more to average than marginal electricity prices. We provide the first empirical evidence on the degree and nature of household informedness over energy consumption relative to peers. As such, we complement previous work by identifying another information friction that affects household energy consumption behavior.
Experimental context, design, and mechanisms
The context for our study is the retail electricity market in the Australian state of Victoria. 
Experiment design
We developed and implemented our information program with an electricity retailer between August 2012 and June 2013. The retailer is a relatively small player in the market with less than 30,000 customers nationwide. We also collaborated with a web-portal developer, Billcap (www.billcap.com). The retailer employed Billcap to provide its customers with online home energy reports that help customers make better-informed energy consumption decisions by visualizing a given household's smart meter data, providing energy saving tips, and presenting peer comparisons over energy use. Figure 1 depicts these various aspects of the home energy reports.
We used a phase-in design to randomly provide households access to home energy reports.
Households were randomized into one of three waves of treatment: October 2012 (wave one), 10 Survey responses were collected and anonymized using the Billcap platform with email-based invitations. Respondents were also asked to provide information on household characteristics such as number of rooms, number of residents, and whether the house has gas appliances, is a detached dwelling or rented/owned. We sent out the survey to the retailer's existing customers prior to Billcap's October 2012 launch. We also surveyed all new customers with a smart meter who signed up with the retailer within our experimental window. These surveys were run shortly after customers signed up but before treatment.
households with the information necessary to undertake energy-saving activities and investments could therefore reduce utility-maximizing energy use.
Second, households may perceive home energy reports as a form of scrutiny over their existing energy use decisions, thereby creating a previously unfelt "moral cost" (Levitt and List, 2007) example, suppose that a household thinks they are "average" (e.g., median) energy users and find out that they are actually use more energy than most of their peers. The family members may be unhappy to learn that they have a significantly higher electricity bills than their neighbors. They may also infer from this peer comparison that some of their practices or appliances are more electricity intensive than they believed. Conversely, a family that takes strict steps to limit electricity use could may be relieved to find out that most households use or pay more for electricity than they do. Learning about how their use compares to others may lead them to suspect that family members would be happier living under a less strict energy use regime. In either case, household responses could indicate a form of social learning, specificially, learning from peers about ones' utility-maximizing electricity consumption level.
A Levitt and List (2007) moral cost story could also generate these patterns. If a household's experienced moral cost depends on its beliefs over how its electricity consumption or associated environmental damage compares to that of peers, then high users who unknowingly underestimate their relative use will realize higher moral costs once informed about true their relative use. New information would also allow low users to relax upon learning that they had previously been over-estimating their relative consumption, giving them moral license (Hard-ing and Rapson 2013) to consume electricity more freely.
Notice that both channels for heterogeneous effects rely on households exhibiting uninformedness/unawareness over how their energy use compares with that of their peers. Our beliefs survey, in combination with our information treatment, allows us to test of whether such information frictions indeed cause heterogeneous treatment effects. The treatment that we negotiated with our private partners does not, however, allow us to discriminate between the social learning and moral cost channels. We instead test empirically for the information frictions required for either of these channels to play a role.
Data
Within our sample window, the retailer had a total of 15,454 customers in the state with a smart meter. We drop all commercial customers, residential customers with solar panels, and large users who consume over 50 kWh/day. 13 We restrict our sample to customers with a smart meter who joined the electricity retailer up to and including March 2013 and track energy use up to June 2013. After imposing these sample restrictions our working sample has 8578 customers, with 765, 4548, and 3265 in treatment waves one, two, and three. Within this sample, 1188 households responded to the baseline survey on energy use beliefs.
The retailer provided us with half hourly smart meter interval data for all customers. We focus, however, on daily energy use so we aggregate the data to daily meter reads. 14 In addition, we were given the complete billing history for all customers. This data allow us to identify the exact date a household started with and left the retailer, which is important for our empirical specifications that deal with attrition below.
We also collected demographic and elections data. Demographic information is collected at the lowest level of aggregation available, with 400 households living within a "Statistical Area
Level 1" (SA1) census tract. 15 We further matched census tract centroids to nearest polling booth. Based on this matching we use the local share of votes for the federal Green party as a proxy for regional levels of environmental consciousness. Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics on pre-treatment energy use and household characteristics for our treatment and control groups. We observe balance and similar trends in energy use across the waves leading up to the October 2012 and March 2013 treatments. The households in each of the three waves also exhibit similar observable characteristics. Moreover, the summary statistics for our survey data in Table 2 largely align with figures from Tustin (2012), who reports that 70% of households in the country have air conditioning, and on average households have 2.6 residents and three bedrooms. shows that survey respondents and non-respondents tend to have similar pre-treatment energy use and demographic characteristics. On the whole, this preliminary look at the data provides reassurance that randomization was successful, and that survey respondents are representative on observables.
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Randomization checks
There is some attrition in the treatment waves: on average, 3.7%, 6.5%, and 1.5% of households in waves one, two, and three drop out of the sample in a given month. 17 Such attrition 15 The retailer used ArcGIS to match households to census tracts based on household street addresses (which were not made available to us). 16 The Green party won 11.76% and 8.65% of all votes in the 2010 and 2013 general elections. This approach to using local party vote shares to reveal preferences pro-environmental programs/policies follows Costa and Kahn (2013) . 17 We formally test for differences in attrition rates between each of the waves in the Appendix. All of the differences are statistically significant. The particularly lower attrition rate in wave three partly reflects that a number of households in this wave sign-up with the retailer towards the latter part of our sample behavior is an unavoidable econometric concern for our experiment because we study a competitive retail market.
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In Tables A.2 and A.3 of the Appendix we check whether attritors and non-attritors differ based on observable characteristics. We find some evidence that attritors tend to use more electricity, however no other significant differences arise between attritors and non-attritors within each treatment wave. All of our econometric specifications below include household fixed effects that account for any observed or unobserved time-invariant factors that generate differential attrition rates across our treatment waves. We also estimate models that allow us to quantify any attrition biases in our information program treatment effect estimates.
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Selection bias is another potential concern if certain types of customers non-randomly switch to our retailer within our sample window in response to the newly-offered Billcap home energy reports. However, given that our retailer was the first to use Billcap's services, and that Billcap was not promoted broadly, it is unlikely such non-random selection occurs.
window. As new customers, they are less likely to attrit as they become familiar with the company.
Findings
This section presents our experimental findings. We start by presenting results from our beliefs survey, highlighting the extent to which households over/under estimate their relative pre-treatment energy use. We then investigate how the treatment effects from our information program vary as a function of these prediction errors. We close by investigating a key implication from these treatment effect estimates, namely how the distribution of informedness over relative energy use affects the external validity of program effects.
Distribution of informedness over relative energy use
Our informedness measure compares households' beliefs to actual relative use levels. Specifically, we compare the quintile of the use distribution that households believe they are in to their actual pre-treatment average use quintile, conditional on the number of rooms in a given household's home. Table 3 More than half of the households (57.5%) believe that their energy use is in the 40-60% quintile of the use distribution. That is, most people think they are "average" users. Of the many users (the remaining 42.5%) that take an active stand as to whether they are above or below average, 71% are wrong. 
Treatment effects from the information program Graphical analysis
Figure 3 visualizes the distribution of average daily energy use across households and months, conditional on whether a given household in a given month was exposed to our information treatment. 20 We plot CDFs for these conditional distributions for four mutually exclusive subpopulations in the data: households who overestimate / underestimate / are correct about their relative energy use quintile (panels A, B, and C), and households who did not respond to the beliefs survey (panel D).
The leftward shift in the CDF in Panel B provides preliminary evidence that households who underestimate their relative energy use indeed reduce consumption once they are informed about their actual location in the energy use distribution. In contrast, we see mixed changes in 20 The only transformation we make to these raw data is we de-mean average monthly household energy use by its sample average across all households for a given month. Doing so removes seasonal trends in 
Pooled treatment effects
To formally estimate the impact of providing home energy reports to households we use the following regression model :
where Y i t is the logarithm of daily energy use (in kWh) for household i on date t , and T i t is a treatment dummy that equals one if household i was offered home energy reports on or before date t , and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest, β 1 , identifies the Intention-to-Treat Effect (ITT) from the information program. The µ i and η t terms correspond to household and date fixed effects which we include in all specifications. These control for time-invariant household characteristics that affect energy use (such has home size or environmental consciousness), as well as date-specific energy use shocks (such as particularly hot or cold days).
For inference, we cluster our standard errors at the household level to account for withinhousehold dependence in i t .
Our pooled treatment effect estimates are presented in Table 4 . In the aggregate, we find no effect of home energy reports on energy use. As a check on whether this arises from studying noisy daily energy use data, we aggregate up our energy use data to the monthly level and reestimate our model. The results, which are reported in column (2), yield similar results.
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Conservation effects may take time to emerge, depending on the rate at which households 21 On the whole, these pooled results fall in line with a collection of previous well-designed information programs (as classified by Delmas et. al 2013) that collectively find negligible conservation effects.
learn about new strategies for conserving energy, or make investments in new energy-saving appliances. In contrast, if our information treatments only work through a short-lived salience effect, then we should expect an immediate response to treatment and subsequent "backsliding" to familiar energy use habits by individuals.
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We estimate time-varying ITTs by interacting months-since-treatment dummies with T i t in our baseline specification for equation (1). Figure 4 present the resulting time-varying treatment effect estimates and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The figures reveal that our information program delivers statistically significant and economically meaningful effects after seven months of treatment. At the seven month mark, energy use falls by 4.6 percent for households who were offered home energy reports. 23 It is interesting to note that despite the vastly different context of our study relative to the benchmark study of Allcott (2011b), we find an effect of similar magnitude. We also find a a similar pattern in the treatment effect over months since treatment. 
Heterogeneous treatment effects among the informed and uninformed
Combining the data from the beliefs survey and information treatment, we now study whether the information program effects differ depending on whether households were ex-ante correct/incorrect about their relative energy use. 25 We use a similar difference-in-difference specification as above to estimate these heterogeneous treatment effects:
where E i j is an indicator variable that equals one if treated household i belongs to group j , depending on whether the household underestimates ( j = 1), is correct about ( j = 2), or overestimates their relative energy use ( j = 3), or whether they were treated but did not respond to the beliefs survey ( j = 4).
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Columns 1 through 4 of Table 5 report our baseline heterogeneous treatment effects. They provide stark evidence that imperfect information over peers' behavior generates treatment effect heterogeneity, as predicted by Becker (1965) and Levitt and List (2007) . Households who overestimate their relative energy use increase their consumption by seven percent once they are informed about their actual relative use. In contrast, households that underestimate their use decrease consumption by four to five percent. In other words, households move in the 25 An assumption of note is that households' beliefs over relative use remain constant up until they date they are offered home energy reports. Under this assumption, we can compare specific treatment groups, say households treated in wave one who have just been told they overestimate their use, to control groups in waves two and three who later learn they have also being overestimate their use. Given the relatively short eight-month time horizon of our study, as well as the limited availability of other comparator websites for energy use available at the time, we believe this assumption is reasonable. 26 In total, 864 households who were treated in the experiment replied to the survey. Comparing respondents use to households of similar size, we have 320 who overestimated, 210 who were correct, and 334 who underestimated.
direction of becoming they type of users that they thought they were. As expected, informed households (e.g., those who were correct about their relative use) do not exhibit any change in their consumption behavior.
The stability of the estimates across columns 1 through 4 imply these results are robust to how we construct peer groups, that is, whether we condition on the number of rooms, residents, or if we do not condition on household characteristics.
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The results are also robust to how we interpret "average user" responses, which are potential "don't know" or guess responses. In column 5 we present estimates dropping households who report they were "average" users. 28 We still find the boomerang effect among over-estimators.
The point estimate for under-estimators is similar to our base results but no longer statistically different from zero.
Mean reversion is a potentially important confound for interpreting the heterogeneous treatment effects. The raw data shows that low users tend to increase their consumption over the sample period whereas high users tend to decrease use. Almost by definition, over-estimators are disproportionately lower users and under-estimators disproportionately higher users, so the estimates presented in columns 1 through 4 of Table 5 could embody both new information and differential trends.
We address potential mean reversion in three ways. First of all, we augment our models to include five sets of date fixed effects, one for each of the five quantiles in pre-treatment average energy use. This approach flexibly controls for differential trends among high and low energy users. The results, which are presented in column 6, yield similar conclusions as our 27 We have also estimated specifications that allow for the intensity of the error, for example whether it matters if a household under/over estimated by one or two quantiles. We find no effect for households who underestimate their use by one or four quintiles. Those who underestimate their use by two or three quintiles reduce consumption by 7%. All households who overestimate their use increase their consumption. 28 This regression also controls for mean reversion with use quintiles.
baseline results, with more modest point estimates. The magnitude of the increase (decrease) in energy use among households who overestimate (underestimate) their relative energy use falls however to five percent (three percent).
In an alternative specification, we include separate date fixed effects for each group of overestimators, under-estimators, correct, and no-answer households. This approach is similar to allowing for separate time trends for each type of household, with no restriction on the form those trends may take. In this specification, however, the standard errors increase because we only have survey responses for a subset of households, whereas we know pre-treatment use quantiles for everyone. The point estimate for the boomerang effect is unchanged; the energy savings from under-estimators is smaller and no longer statistically different from zero.
Finally, we also show the estimates for each sub-group by average pre-treatment energy use quintile. Ours results are reported in Table 6 . All of the coefficients shown come from a single regression. Although the point estimates are not statistically different from each other, we see that, of all the high users, it is only those who underestimated their use that respond to the information treatment in a statistically-significant way. Similarly, of all the low users, it is only those that thought that they were high users that respond to information by increasing use.
These regression results are also interesting in that we see that the treatment effect for those who underestimate is largely driven by those in the highest use quintile. Similarly, the effect on those who overestimate is driven by those whose pre-treatment actual use is in the smallest quintile. These findings are consistent with these groups having the most to learn from their peers in an environment with social learning, or realizing the highest moral costs or moral license in an environment with social norms.
The remaining robustness checks in columns 8 through 10 of Table 5 show that our results are largely robust to using data only for survey respondents, aggregating to monthly energy use, and correcting for attrition bias. The column 8 results, which involve a substantial reduction in sample size, highlight how the identification and accuracy of the underestimating households depends on the inclusion of the non-survey respondents in the control group. To reflect the timing of decisions to change retailers, we estimate treatment effects accounting for attrition at the monthly level. For the attrition correction we use a parametric inverse probability weight 20 estimator, where we allow for attrition at date t to depend on a household's pricing plan, the number of a months it has been with the retailer, and lagged energy consumption.
We then estimate time-varying heterogeneous treatment effects among households that overestimate/are correct about/underestimate their relative use. In constructing our peer groups, we continue to condition on the number of rooms in a home. We again present treatment effect estimates at monthly frequencies. The results, which are presented in Figure 4 , reveal key insights for the literature on information treatments. Panel A shows that households that overestimated their energy use (e.g., low users who thought they were high users) exhibit a temporary boomerang effect in the first four months of treatment that subsequently dissipates over time. In contrast, Panel B shows that households that underestimated (e.g., high users that thought they were low users) reduce their electricity consumption gradually and consistently over time. Panels C and D show that informed households and non-survey respondents do not exhibit significant treatment effects at any point within our sample window.
Taken together, these figures are encouraging for policymakers looking to promote energy conservation through peer comparisons. In our sample boomerang effects that harm energy conservation efforts largely appear to be shortly-lived salience effects. Underestimating households, on the other hand, appear to permanently change their behavior in response to the new information, potentially by learning from their peers' behavior and/or responding to previously unfelt moral costs from using relatively large amounts of energy. As the latter effect starts to dominate, we should expect energy conservation effects to emerge over time in the population as we found in Figure 4 , and as others have documented (Allcott 2011b and Allcott and Rogers 2012) .
29 29 These patterns in treatment effects for households that over/underestimate energy use are robust to correcting for attrition, though the estimates are somewhat noisier under these corrections.
Informedness and external validity
To conclude our analysis, we use our novel treatment effect estimates to highlight the pivotal role that population (un)informedness plays in determining information program effects.
This issue of external validity is perhaps the most important implication stemming from our heterogeneous treatment effects. It is particularly relevant for policymakers concerned with scaling up programs on the basis of evidence from locally-run or pilot experiments.
We use Monte-Carlo simulations for our investigation. Specifically, we create Monte Carlo samples by re-sampling from our original dataset with nine different frequencies of households who under and over estimated their consumption. We take 500 samples of each of these nine different frequencies. In constructing the samples, we keep constant both the control group and the subsample that did not answer the survey. We also hold fixed the ratio of total under and over estimators to those that stated their true consumption quantile. We then re-estimate pooled and time-varying treatment effects for each Monte Carlo sample. We then estimate pooled and time varying effects for each of these 4500 samples, bootstrapping standard errors.
Our simulation results in Table 7 quantify the rate at which conservation effects from the information program rise with the fraction of the population that underestimate their energy use. Panel A does so using the pooled treatment effects from Table 4 ( These time varying estimates also provide further evidence that the boomerang effect for the over-estimators is temporary, by seven months after treatment, the average effect of treatment is four percent regardless of the proportion of over-estimators in the sample.
The above results beg the following question: who are the underestimating households that are most likely to exhibit long-run conservation effects from information programs? Given that most households think they are average, and in light of the estimates by usage level and informedness in Table 6 , high energy users clearly stand out as a particularly sensitive group to 22 behavioral nudges with peer comparisons.
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To examine other factors that might explain household informedness, we run auxiliary multinomial logistic regressions that correlate census-block household demographics and voting records with whether a household overestimates, is correct about, or underestimates their energy usage. We report the coefficient estimates from these regressions in Table 8 . 31 The main takeaway is that Green voters, particularly those with higher incomes, systematically underestimate their energy use (i.e. think they conserve more energy relative to their peers than they actually do). Although this result may not be surprising, it does contradict an equally plausible finding that Greens are more informed about their use because they care more about conservation. This result offers an alternative, information-based interpretation of the findings from Costa and Kahn (2013) . These authors interpret Liberal votes' relatively large responses to a similar information program as stemming from political ideology. Alternately, the responses that they observe could be driven -or at least amplified -by a systematic tendency to underestimate carbon footprints. Liberals may respond the most because they are learning the most.
Conclusions
In this paper, we used a field experiment to study the impacts of an information program with peer comparisons. We found that the effects differ depending on what households knew 30 It is worth noting that we strictly identify an informational channel for this effect. This contrasts with interpretation of heterogeneous treatment effects in previous studies on energy and water conservation (Allcott 2011b, Ferraro and Price 2013) where it is argued that in addition to the role information frictions potentially play in generating larger conservation effects among high energy/water users, that these types may be more responsive to peer comparisons because it is easier or less costly for them to find ways to reduce their energy/water usage. 31 We estimate similar multinomial logits at the household-level using home characteristics data from our pre-treatment survey. For the interested reader, we present these estimates in the Table A showing that estimated effects differ by prior knowledge, we provide the first direct test of this channel. In doing so we have, at the very least, validated previous researchers' interpretations of information program effects. Our findings should also guide future attempts to uncover mechanisms through which information treatments affect behavior.
From a program evaluation perspective, we effectively experimented with a standard experimental design for information programs by first running a pre-treatment beliefs survey. We found the survey to be extremely useful for uncovering an important source of unobserved heterogeneity -informedness about peer behavior -and thus understanding the channels through which program effects arise.
Depending on the application, households may feel harmed from revealing their beliefs exante and being told they were wrong ex-post. These ethics concerns will be minimized, however, when there is a significant lag between survey collection and information treatment or when there is low social pressure to know the correct answer to the question. Keeping these potential ethics concerns in mind, we hope that our study will motivate researchers to collect data on baseline beliefs prior to implementing information treatments. Notes: Electricity consumption data is reported at the monthly level (average of daily kWh) for any month before a household receives treatment. Difference in means between Wave 1 and its control group (households in Waves 2 and 3) reported in Column (3) and between Wave 2 and its control group (households in Wave 3) in column (6). Standard errors of differences reported in brackets are clustered at postcode level. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. See the text for wave definitions. Notes: Means and difference in means between waves reported. Standard errors of differences reported in brackets clustered at postcode level. Census and voting data reported at Statistical Area Level 1 (SA1). * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 See the text for wave definitions. (1) and (2) is log(kWh/day), and for columns (3) and (4) is monthly average log(kWh/day). Standard errors clustered at household level. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. (8) and (9) for which is average log(kWh/day) at the monthly level. Standard errors are clustered at household level. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Over (under) estimated implies that a household's prior belief about their use was an over (under) estimate of their household's actual consumption. In all columns except for Columns (3) and (4) actual consumption is assessed relative to households with the same number of bedrooms. Column (3) compares consumption for same number of residents and Column (4) compares within the entire sample. Estimates in Columns (5), (6) and (8) through (10) include corrections for mean reversion by use quintile. In Column (5) the sample is restricted to households that stated that they believed they were strictly above or strictly below average. In Column (8) the sample is restricted to households who answered the survey, i.e. with known number of bedrooms. Estimates in column (10) are computed using Inverse Probability Weights (IPW) to account for sample attrition. The first stage attrition model for column (10) includes one period lags of the treatment indicator and electricity consumption as well as indicators for distributor and price plan. Notes: Electricity consumption data is reported at the monthly level (average of daily kWh) for any month before a household receives treatment. Means reported for households retained and households who attrited before June 2013. Means reported only for months with observations for at least 100 households per wave. Differences and standard error of difference (in brackets, clustered at postcode level) reported. * pv al ue < 0.10, * * pv al ue < 0.05, * * * pv al ue < 0.01 Wave 1 households were assigned to the treatment group prior to March 2013. Wave 2 households were assigned to the treatment group between March 2013 and June 2013. Wave 3 households are control households and assigned to treatment at the end of our sample period (June 2013). Notes: Wave 1 households were assigned to the treatment group prior to March 2013. Wave 2 households were assigned to treatment group between March 2013 and June 2013. Wave 3 households are control households and assigned to treatment at the end of our sample period (June 2013). Census and voting data reported at Statistical Area Level 1 (SA1). Differences are reported for tests of differences in means between households retained throughout the sample period, and households who attrited within a Wave. Standard errors of differences (clustered at postcode level) reported in brackets. Notes: Monthly attrition rates and differences by wave reported. Standard errors of differences reported in brackets. * pv al ue < 0.10, * * pv al ue < 0.05, * * * pv al ue < 0.01. Wave 1 households were assigned to the treatment group prior to March 2013. Wave 2 households were assigned to the treatment group between March 2013 and June 2013. Wave 3 households are control households and assigned to treatment at the end of our sample period (June 2013). Notes: Coefficients of multinomial logit explaining informedness relative to houses with the same number of bedrooms. The omitted category is households who are correct regarding their relative usage. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 . Column (2) includes the variable 'Is a rental property' which was only asked during later waves of survey data collection. Column (3) Households who did not consider themselves average.
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A.3 Testing for common trends in pre-treatment consumption
Our identification of the treatment effect of the information program relies on the assumption that treatment and control groups share a common linear time trend. We are not able to test this assumption over the experimental window. However, we can provide some evidence for common trends in the pre-treatment period. To do so, we divide our sample into the three groups corresponding to the three waves of treatment. We focus on the period prior to the first treatment date in our sample (August 2012). We specify the following model for consumption of households in each wave:
where Y i t is the logarithm of daily energy use (in kWh) for household i on date t , and w i t j is a dummy that equals one if household i is a member of wave j . The composite error includes a household-specific effect µ i , a date-specific effect η t , and an idiosyncratic shock i t . The parameter τ j captures the linear time trend of households in wave j , conditional on household and date fixed effects. We then test whether τ 1 = τ 2 = τ 3 . The P-value for this test is 0.69. This provides some reassurance that at least in the period just before the initial wave of treatment that the common trends assumption cannot be rejected.
